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INTRODUCTION

On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive
order—now commonly known as the first “travel ban.” The order
suspended the entry of individuals from seven named countries, all with
predominantly Muslim populations.1 Almost immediately, chaos broke out
at airports throughout the United States. Countless individuals—among
them, green card holders, refugees, and college students—were stranded at
airports or sent back to their countries of origin.2
Amidst all the chaos, groups of individuals and states filed suit,
challenging the executive order on constitutional and statutory grounds.3
And on February 3, 2017, just six days after President Trump signed the
order, a single federal district court judge in Washington issued a
nationwide injunction against the travel ban.4 The President did not take
kindly to this judicial interference. He disparaged the member of the
Article III judiciary as a “so-called judge” and denounced the judicial
* Copyright © 2018 by Tara Leigh Grove, Professor of Law, William and Mary Law
School. I am grateful to Neal Devins, Johanna Kalb, Rob Kaplan, Alan Meese, and Keith
Whittington for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1 Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Targets Muslim Areas in Refugee Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2017, at A1.
2 See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Causing Chaos—And Putting His Unflinching
Nationalism
to
the
Test,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
29,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/president-trumps-travel-ban-iscausing-chaos-dont-expect-him-to-back-down/?utm_term=.1adaf571d5cf; see also Nicholas
Kulish, Legal Challenge to Trump’s First Travel Ban Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2017, at
A16 (“Scores of refugees and immigrants found themselves trapped in airports . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8–13, Washington v. Trump,
No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). See also Scott Malone & Dan Levine, Challenges
to Trump’s Immigration Orders Spread to More U.S. States, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2017, 1:21 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-sanfrancisco/challenges-to-trumpsimmigration-orders-spread-to-more-u-s-states-idUSKBN15F2B1.
4 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017) (issuing a preliminary nationwide injunction).
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decision as “ridiculous.”5
Nevertheless, as soon as that federal district judge issued the
nationwide injunction, everything stopped. The chaos at the airports, the
stranding of individuals—all of it came to a close. The Department of
Homeland Security immediately complied with the federal court’s
injunction.6 With the stroke of a pen, and in defiance of the President, a
single federal judge had stopped the federal government in its tracks.
The federal executive’s compliance with that judicial order (and other
orders)7 enjoining the President’s travel bans is just one illustration of a
broader phenomenon. As I detail in separate work,8 in our country, there is
a convention—a widespread bipartisan norm—requiring compliance with
federal court decrees. Under our current convention, political actors assume
that they must comply, even if they believe the judge was not only wrong
on the merits but also lacked jurisdiction to issue the decision. Moreover,
this convention requires compliance with both Supreme Court and, as the
travel ban cases illustrate, lower federal court rulings as well. This
convention of obedience is one of the most important—and, I will suggest,
fragile—symbols of judicial independence today.
In this short essay, I seek to make two general observations. First, the
convention requiring compliance with federal court orders is of relatively
recent vintage: it dates only from the mid-twentieth century. That fact alone
underscores the fragility of this aspect of judicial independence. Second,
notwithstanding that fragility, I argue that there are good reasons to expect
continued compliance by the federal executive branch, at least for the
foreseeable future.
I
THE RECENT VINTAGE OF THE NORM

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was no strong

5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 8:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976 (“The opinion of this so-called
judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be
overturned!”).
6 See Laura Jarrett, Rene Marsh & Laura Koran, Homeland Security Suspends Travel Ban,
CNN POL. (Feb. 4, 2017, 6:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/federal-judgetemporarily-halts-trump-travel-ban-nationwide-ag-says/index.html (noting that, following the
nationwide injunction, the Department of Homeland Security “suspended all actions to implement
the immigration order”).
7 See Richard Pérez-Pena, Second Federal Judge Blocks the Third Revision of the Travel
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2017, at A19 (noting that the Trump administration would “appeal the
rulings” of two other district courts in Maryland and Hawaii, both of which issued similar
preliminary injunctions against a previous version of the travel ban).
8 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 465, 467–70, 488–505 (2018).
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bipartisan norm requiring compliance with federal court orders.9 When
political actors disobeyed the federal judiciary, they were often cheered on
by their political supporters. For example, in the 1830s, many Democrats
praised the governor of Georgia, when he openly defied two Supreme
Court decisions involving the interests of Native Americans.10 Along the
same lines, in the 1860s, many Republicans defended President Abraham
Lincoln when his administration declined to release a prisoner—despite a
habeas corpus order by a federal judge.11
This trend of executive defiance continued into the civil rights era of
the 1950s and 1960s. Following the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,12 “[t]hroughout the South, governors and
gubernatorial candidates called for defiance of court orders.”13 Several
followed through on this pledge. Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, for
example, obstructed a federal desegregation decree when he directed state
troops to prevent black students from entering Little Rock High School.14
And Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett followed suit in 1962 when he
violated a federal court order by blocking the admission of James Meredith,
who was about to become the University of Mississippi’s first black
student.15
One might have thought that by the 1960s, such open defiance of the
Article III judiciary would be deemed unacceptable. Yet segregationists
cheered on the obstruction.16 For example, following the Ole Miss incident,
Senate Majority Leader James Eastland insisted that “Governor Barnett is
entitled to the admiration and respect of all Americans.”17 To defend his
State’s authority, Barnett had “courageously and boldly pressed himself
9

See id. at 488, 490–96.
See id. at 493–95 (discussing the case of Corn Tassel and describing Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which involved the prosecution of two missionaries under a
Georgia state law that “prohibited white men from living in Cherokee territory without a license
from the governor”).
11 See id. at 492–93 (discussing the political reaction to Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 78 (2d ed. 2008).
14 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 326 (2004). Governor Faubus later withdrew the
state forces (when threatened with a contempt citation), but a mob of private individuals
continued to prevent entry to the school, while state officials looked the other way. Id.
15 See CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES M EREDITH AND THE
INTEGRATION OF OLE MISS 283–84 (2014). Governor Barnett was later found in contempt of
court. See Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
16 See Grove, supra note 8, at 496–97.
17 108 CONG. REC. S20,805 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1962) (statement of Sen. Eastland); see also
KLARMAN, supra note 14, at 407 (explaining that Alabama’s “entire congressional delegation . . .
supported Barnett” and a number of prominent state politicians also supported him).
10
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forward, both as Governor and as an individual, and obstructed an order of
a U.S. Court.”18
The convention requiring compliance with federal court orders was
not established until after the civil rights movement. Indeed, I argue that
the norm arose in large part because of the civil rights movement.19 In
subsequent decades, the massive resistance to Brown became the
paradigmatic example of defiance of the federal courts. And, as Brown
became “canonical,”20 the resistance to the decision was viewed as one of
the most disgraceful moments in American history. Segregationists who
openly obstructed federal desegregation orders were transformed from
“regional hero[es]” into historical villains.21 This civil rights paradigm both
helped to establish and serves to reinforce the convention ensuring
obedience to the federal courts. Modern political actors do not want to be
equated with the segregationists who sought to obstruct Brown.
II
THE STRENGTH OF THE NORM AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

Since the civil rights era, federal executive officials have consistently
complied with federal court orders.22 One of the most instructive examples
is the George W. Bush administration’s obedience in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration made bold claims
about the scope of executive authority in the war on terror—leading some
scholars to worry that the administration might not obey a judicial order
restricting its power.23 Yet when the Supreme Court held that Guantanamo
Bay detainees could file federal habeas corpus petitions to challenge their
confinement,24 President Bush announced: “We’ll abide by the Court’s
decision. That doesn’t mean I have to agree with it.”25
18

108 CONG. REC. S20,805 (statement of Sen. Eastland).
See Grove, supra note 8, at 498–505, 531–32.
20 See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 1018–19 (1998); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011)
(describing “the constitutional canon” as “the set of decisions whose correctness participants in
constitutional argument must always assume. Brown . . . is the classic example”).
21 Cf. KLARMAN, supra note 14, at 398 (noting that, in the 1950s, aggressive defiance of
federal authority translated into political gain for southern politicians).
22 See Grove, supra note 8, at 488–90, 490 n.131, 498–501, 500 n.201 (describing
compliance during the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Reagan, George W. Bush, Obama,
and Trump). The norm seems to be somewhat weaker at the state and local level. See id. at 502–
05. That may be in part because there are fewer institutional structures supporting compliance.
23 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting that “[t]he immanent logic of the Bush administration’s position” on
unilateral executive power could imply that “the President could also, under the Constitution,
lawfully refuse to obey a judicial order”).
24 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
25 Nina Totenberg, Trump’s Criticism of Judges out of Line with Past Presidents, NPR POL.
19
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Recent episodes, however, raise questions about the continuing
adherence to this convention. One cause for concern is President Trump’s
rhetoric denouncing federal judges that interfere with his travel ban.
Although other presidents have criticized the judiciary, most have not
mounted seemingly personal attacks against specific judges.26 Another
worrisome sign is the pardon of former Arizona Sherriff Joe Arpaio. In
2016, Arpaio was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a federal
court order, which restricted his authority to arrest and detain
undocumented immigrants.27 On August 25, 2017, President Trump
pardoned Arpaio28—a move that could be seen as an endorsement of not
only the sheriff’s aggressive law enforcement tactics but also his defiance
of the federal court.
Nevertheless, I believe there are good reasons to expect continued
compliance by the executive branch, at least for the foreseeable future.
Several factors serve to reinforce the convention requiring obedience to all
federal court orders. The first is the fact that both Republican and
Democratic presidential administrations have consistently complied from
the 1970s to the present day.29 That historical record alone places some
pressure on current executive officials to continue to adhere to federal court
decrees.
Another important factor is the institutional role of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The DOJ’s primary function is to represent the interests of
the United States in federal court.30 In order to perform this function
effectively—that is, to win cases in court—the DOJ must maintain a certain
level of credibility with the federal judiciary. The DOJ would have
difficulty maintaining that credibility if its “client” (the federal
government) threatened to violate adverse federal court orders.

(Feb. 11, 2017, 6:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-criticism-ofjudges-out-of-line-with-past-presidents (quoting President Bush and noting that he refrained from
making personal attacks on judges).
26 See id. (noting that past presidents avoided berating the judiciary in public and leveling
personal attacks against individual judges).
27 See Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio Guilty on Three Counts of Civil Contempt, Criminal
Contempt Still Possible, PHX. NEW TIMES (May 13, 2016, 9:21 PM),
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/joe-arpaio-guilty-on-three-counts-of-civil-contemptcriminal-contempt-still-possible-8293359.
28 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Trump Pardons
Sheriff Joe Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidenttrump-pardons-sheriff-joe-arpaio/.
29 See Grove, supra note 8, at 488–90, 490 n.131, 498–501, 500 n.201 (describing
compliance during the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Reagan, George W. Bush, and
Obama).
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States . . . is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department
of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”).
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Accordingly, the DOJ has a strong institutional incentive to push the rest of
the federal executive branch to abide by federal court judgments.31 These
institutional incentives are bolstered by the culture among the attorneys at
the DOJ. These attorneys were trained in a legal community that has long
promoted compliance with federal court orders.32 Indeed, it likely does not
occur to many lawyers at the DOJ that defiance is a viable, much less legal,
option.
Furthermore, the President himself may decide that there are political
advantages to adhering to adverse federal court orders. Judicial review can,
after all, be useful to politicians.33 When a federal court invalidates a
controversial measure, politicians can claim credit for the measure—and
blame “activist” judges for striking it down—while avoiding much of the
political fallout from implementation. Thus, President Trump may have
decided that compliance with the travel ban rulings offered the best of both
worlds: he could claim credit for (what he describes as) a national security
measure, while avoiding at least some of the political fallout.34
There are reasons to believe that these political and institutional
incentives have been working (at least thus far). Despite the President’s
rhetoric denouncing specific judicial decisions, the Trump administration
has thus far complied with every nationwide injunction against it—on
topics ranging from the travel ban, to funding for sanctuary cities,35 to the
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

31 This argument links up with Neal Katyal’s observations about the executive branch’s
“internal separation of powers.” Neal Kumar Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006)
(arguing that the civil service bureaucracy can help “constrain presidential adventurism”).
32 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1132–33 (2013) (arguing that a law school
education gives executive branch lawyers “a common socialization” in a community with a
“shared set of norms”); see also Grove, supra note 8, at 528–29, 531–32 (documenting how law
school casebooks since the 1960s have reinforced the norm requiring compliance). My own
experience as a DOJ attorney supports the argument that there are institutional incentives.
33 The literature supporting this point is vast. For a few examples, see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, P OLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF J UDICIAL S UPREMACY: THE PRESIDENT, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 155–56 (2007) (arguing
that judicial authority provides politicians with a “self-legitimation” tool); Mark A. Graber, The
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. P OL. DEV. 35,
36 (1993) (asserting that “prominent elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve”
contentious issues).
34 Polls suggest that the American public has been split on the travel ban. See Steven
Shepard, Majority of Voters Back Trump Travel Ban, POLITICO (July 5, 2017, 5:58 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-travel-ban-poll-voters-240215 (noting that
“[p]olling on the travel restrictions has varied wildly,” although finding majority support in a July
2017 poll).
35 See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(enjoining an executive order purporting to withdraw federal funds from sanctuary cities).
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program. 36 These examples not only signal the current administration’s
acceptance of the convention requiring compliance with federal court
orders but also serve to reinforce and solidify that convention going
forward.
CONCLUSION

I do not mean to suggest that we should be sanguine about the future
of judicial independence. Rhetoric matters, and President Trump’s attacks
on judges understandably sent a chill throughout the legal community. But
actions matter, too. And it is crucial that, each time a federal judge has
issued a nationwide injunction against the travel ban (and other executive
actions), the Trump administration has quickly complied, promising to
challenge the order through the ordinary appellate review process.37 The
compliance of the executive branch—perhaps especially given the
President’s strong rhetoric—itself reinforces the convention. At least for
now, it seems, even “so-called judges” have the power to order around the
most powerful government in the world.

36 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17–05211
WHA, 2018 WL 339144, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018) (ordering the defendants to maintain the
DACA program on a nationwide basis on the same terms and conditions that were in effect before
the September 5, 2017, rescission); see also Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, No. 16–CV–4756 (NGG)
(JO), 2018 WL 834074, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018) (issuing a preliminary nationwide
injunction on similar grounds).
37 Notably, President Trump promised to go through the ordinary appellate process in some
of the very same comments that denounced federal court rulings. See Trump, supra note 5 (“The
opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country,
is ridiculous and will be overturned!”) (emphasis added).

